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SUMMARY 
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court considers the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the loosing party - in this case, Sandy City ("City").1 Appellees 
McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's) and Salt Lake ( ounty ("County11) have filed briefs 
on appeal. The theme of both briefs is that the Utah statutes, County ordinances, and rules 
of procedure, which form the basis of this appeal, do not apply to them. They support this 
motif on a startling construction of the evidence - sometimes fictitious but always in a light 
most favorable to themselves They hope, through such posture, to limit review of this 
appeal to the narrowest possible scope. 
Appellees' arguments are not valid. Nevertheless, it is possible that these allegations 
may cause confusion or distraction from the issues. For this reason, the City has prepared 
this reply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEES' BREFS REST ON MULTIPLE FICTIONS 
A. APPELLEES' LACHES ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
Laches is an equitable defense consisting of these elements: (1) there must be a 
showing of undue delay as a result of a clear lack of diligence; (2) there must be shown 
some identifiable damage, injury, or prejudice which resulted directly from the unwarranted 
delay. McDonald's acknowledges its burden to prove these elements2 but fails to cite 
evidence justifying their application to this action. 
1
 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2
 Brief of Appellee McDonald's Corporation, at p. 16. 
Sandy Did Not Unduly Delay. 
McDonald's brief poses the following two fictions to establish that the City unduly 
delayed filing of this action: 
Fiction No. 1 - That "Sandy knew McDonald's was purchasing the McDonald's 
Parcel" and should have joined McDonald's as a defendant in its prior (Chevron) 
action.3 
Throughout the development approval process, McDonald's claimed that it did not 
own the site. It professed to be acting only as an agent for the real property owners.4 
This was later confirmed in part. McDonald's did not own its parcel at the time the 
conditional use permit was approved5, at the time the Chevron action was filed6, or at the 
time summary judgment was granted in the Chevron case.7 
McDonald's incorrecdy asserts that it disclosed to the County that it was purchasing 
the property and that the City was likewise informed.8 Its citations to the record do not 
disclose any such thing.9 Rather, McDonald's counsel led both the County Commission 
and the City to believe that it had not yet acquired an interest. December 9,1987 County 
Commission minutes approving McDonald's development state: 
3
 McDonald's brief, at p. 17. 
4
 Record at 104. 
5
 December 9,1987. 
6
 This action challenged development on the entire 4.18 acre site. Third District Court Civil No. C87-07304 
was initiated November 6, 1987, against the County, the Planning Commission, the property owners, Chevron 
U.S.A. and its agent. R163-175. 
7
 Order of March 15,1988. Record at 199. 
8
 McDonald's brief, pp. 8-9. 
9
 McDonald's cites to Rue, 87-88, 97-99, 100-102, and 118-120. 
2 
"Commissioner Barker asked if the property is now owned by McDonald's, or 
will it be?" 
"Ms. Fierhelm [counsel for McDonald's] stated that it will be."10 
McDonald's did eventually acknowledge it had executed an earnest money 
agreement on October 12,1987.11 However, disclosure was withheld nearly a year - until 
August 12,198812-- after the County had completed its review, after summary judgment was 
granted in the Chevron case, and after the instant action had been filed. As a result, 
investigation by the City at the time of the Chevron action failed to disclose a property 
interest owned by McDonald's.13 
McDonald's purpose in keeping its earnest money offer secret is transparent. It was 
understandably reluctant to acknowledge that it had offered to pay $500,000 just for the 
site,14 in light of the $750,000 urban development restriction. It may also have wanted to 
support the owner's contention that he would develop the entire 4.18 acre tract, so that his 
promises to the neighbors could appear to be honored.15 
Regardless of McDonald's reasons for secrecy, the City could not rightly join 
1U
 Record at 85. 
11
 Id. at 105-115. 
12/d., at 100-102,118-120. 
13
 Id., at 323.6 and 323.10. 
14
 Id., at 105. 
15
 The owners of the tract promised that they would be the sole developers of the project and that the 
entire site would proceed as a single development. Record at 89. 
3 
McDonald's in the Chevron action when it could not establish an interest peculiar to it.16 
The real owners were already parties in the Chevron action and were represented by legal 
counsel. 
Nevertheless, the City recognized that McDonald's had claimed to be an 
administrative agent for the property owners. Accordingly, it provided McDonald's notice 
of all proceedings in the district court. These notices were intended to honor McDonald's 
claim of agency and to expedite McDonald's intervention, if it acquired an interest sufficient 
to do so. 
McDonald's did not intervene in the prior action, either as an agent or as an owner. 
Instead, it waited to purchase until after summary judgment had been granted.17 Even then 
it did not tell the City it had acquired the property.18 The City did not learn of McDonald's 
purchase until April 1988.19 By then, a final ruling had been made in the Chevron case and 
it would have served no purpose to have named McDonald's in that action. 
Thus, McDonald's claim that it should have been named in the Chevron action is not 
supported by the evidence. The City prudently chose not to subject McDonald's to 
litigation costs since it had disclosed no interest in the property. Nevertheless, the City 
kept McDonald's informed of each stage of the litigation in order that McDonald's could 
intervene if it acquired an interest worth defending. 
A relationship of interest in a conflict is required of one sought to be joined in an action. Young v. 
Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 259 P.2d 876, 878 (1953). Joinder of a party is not required where it is not shown to 
have a joint interest in the action. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Oftce, 621 P.2d 1234,1236-37 (Utah 1980). 
17
 Record at 102, 535. 
18
 Its counsel only requested that its name be taken off the mailing matrix in the Chevron action. Affidavit 
of Walter Miller, Exhibit "C." This exhibit is not paginated but appears at rear of Record, Vol. II. 
19
 Record at 6-7. 
4 
Armed with knowledge of the Chevron action, McDonald's could have disclosed its 
earnest money agreement, acquired ownership, or, in its own name, moved to intervene. 
It chose to do none of these. It provided the City no basis for action against it then -- it 
should not now criticize the City for failing to detect its confidential agreements. 
Fiction No. 2 - That the City "could observe construction of the Restaurant" and 
could have initiated "a separate action before construction of the restaurant began.20 
McDonald's states that construction of its fast-food outlet commenced on April 25, 
1988 - 49 days before this action was filed. However, it gives no description of that activity 
and it is impossible to determine what was meant by "construction" and whether it was 
actually observable. 
The City concedes that site work had commenced by late April. Its inspectors had 
detected large-scale site work by April 22,1988. That work consisted of grading the entire 
4.18 acre development and survey staking on large portions thereof.21 The property owners 
(Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot) did this work as part of their overall development.22 
On learning of the massive grading, the City immediately moved the district court 
for an injunction. Since the entire site was under development and all known owners and 
their property were already subject to the Chevron action, the motion was brought in that 
case. That motion was designated Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal and was denied 
on May 5, 1988. 
The City apparently learned of construction specific to the McDonald's site the day 
McDonald's brief, p. 17. 
The scale of this work is detailed in the Affidavit of Robert J. Ellis, on file in the Chevron Action.. 
Record at 107, 323.19. The owners had contracted to deliver a fully improved site. 
5 
its motion for an injunction was denied.23 It immediately informed counsel for McDonald 
that it would seek enforcement action through the County to halt construction.24 
On May 10, 1988, the City petitioned the County Attorney to enjoin further 
development on the McDonald's site. The following day, the City mailed a letter to 
counsel for McDonald, confirming that it was seeking further enforcement action against 
the McDonald project and that if the City was unsuccessful in that effort, it would institute 
further legal action to enjoin development of the project.25 
On May 27, 1988, the City received a response from the County Attorney refusing 
to enjoin the development. The City filed this action 16 days later. 
The foregoing does not describe a City unduly delaying litigation; it describes a City 
attempting to resolve a dispute at the lowest administrative level; of bringing litigation 
promptly when necessary; of measuring the litigation to avoid costs to those without 
interests; and of keeping persons with a potential interest informed of all proceedings in 
order that they may assert an interest when and if acquired. 
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the City, there is no basis to 
conclude that the City unduly delayed litigation or otherwise acted imprudently. 
Injury Did Not Result From City Delay. McDonald's appeal brief asserts as 
damages both costs of litigation and the risk that McDonald's may be required to comply 
with Sandy zoning or building codes.26 However, in its hundreds of pages of submissions 
** Record at 30. 
2 4
 Id., at 30. 
2 5
 Id.y at 30-31. 
2 6
 Id. 
6 
to the District court, McDonald's provided no evidence of any injury.27 
It is irrational to assert that a failure to join McDonald's in the Chevron action 
increased litigation costs, without offering some evidence of that fact. Litigation costs 
generally result from filing actions, not from failing to do so. In any case, McDonald's 
could have joined in the Chevron action but did not. McDonald's was well informed in 
making that decision and should not now ask the City to take responsibility for it. 
McDonald's also claims as injury the risk that it may be required to comply with 
Sandy zoning or building codes.28 Again, it offers no evidence of such a contingency. It 
merely asserts that the City may preclude all commercial activity on the site. 
The record does not support the allegation that McDonald's would be denied the 
right to operate under City zoning. The City has been concerned about commercial use 
of this corner, but the issue is not closed. It has approved commercial development on all 
four corners of many intersections.29 The City's Planning Commission invited the 
developers to meet in public hearing and discuss zoning options on the property.30 
McDonald's also has the right to make an administrative appeal of any unfair enforcement 
decision.31 
*' Brief of Appellant (City) at 10-11. 
2 8
 Id. 
2 9
 Record at 40. Testimony of Wayne Mickelson. 
3 0
 "Commissioner Steward asked Mr. Miller [City Attorney] if Sandy City is currently considering their 
ordinance to have intersections contain more than one quadrant of commercial development. Mr. Miller said 
yes, in a sense. The Chairman of the Planning Commission is here, they had such strong feelings expressed by 
the developers in this case, and the allegations that Sandy City was inconsistent in their approach of that, they 
set for hearing before the Planning Commission and invited them through their council(sic), to meet with them 
and say if there was something wrong the way they are doing this." Record at 42. 
31
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-12. 
7 
McDonald's supposed injuries are speculative and fictitious. It knew its use permit 
would end up in court and asked the County Commission to "allow the court to determine 
what urban development is."32 It knew that the City had filed an action against the entire 
development, had moved for an injunction following summary judgment, and had petitioned 
the County Attorney to halt construction. McDonald's also knew - because it was told -
that the City would file a civil action if the County Attorney failed to act. 
Thus, McDonald's was not commencing construction on the expectation of no further 
legal challenge. It was proceeding knowingly, in the face of certain litigation. Its purpose 
appears to have been strategic - a gamble only large corporations can afford to make. 
Construed in the light most favorable to the City, McDonald's was apparently rushing to 
complete construction before action was commenced, recognizing the reluctance a reviewing 
court or City officials would have to undo such a decision. 
McDonald's brief brings that strategy to fruition. It has skillfully used the complete 
construction of its building, as the basis to claim it has been harmed. However, in so doing 
it has glossed over the record, traded on the margin of fact, and framed all events in the 
light most favorable to itself. Under well established principles of appellate review, such 
strategy and construction merits remand in order that a full factual review can proceed. 
B. APPELLEES' BRIEFS ARE BASED ON A SUPERFICIAL AND ERRONEOUS 
DEVELOPMENT MODEL WHICH CASTS FACTS IN LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THEMSELVES. 
McDonald's suggests that the City has no right to concern itself with what 
development occurs within its unincorporated islands. It characterizes the City's motives 
as political maneuvering in the context of a petty jurisdictional dispute but offers no 
Record at 85. 
8 
supportive evidence.33 More importantiy, its assertion distorts the real problems which 
have been caused by Salt Lake County's development policies. 
1. Salt Lake County is not a Utah Municipality but is in Active Competition with 
Utah Cities in Contravention of Sound Legislative Policy. 
Utah's Constitution establishes a plan under which urban service delivery is managed. 
Cities are empowered to provide the full range of urban services necessary for urban 
development.34 City officials are elected and closely scrutinized to insure that community 
interests are considered and balanced in a coordinated manner. 
Counties also play a role under our constitutional model, but their powers to provide 
and fund urban services are strictly limited.35 Salt Lake County seems to have found a path 
around these limits. Contrary to the constitutional model, Salt Lake County promotes 
urban development but then leaves the bulk of service delivery to limited function districts. 
While this increases the County's tax base, it creates enormous governance problems. 
2. Past Consequences of Salt Lake County's Development Policies Illustrate why 
the Urban Development Statute must now be Honored. 
The proliferation of special purpose districts has created serious local governance 
problems in Utah. These districts exercise limited functions and operate apart from general 
units of local government such as cities and counties. The territorial jurisdiction of districts 
often overlap, creating difficult problems particularly in metropolitan areas.36 
Special districts handle each aspect of service delivery as a free-wheeling entity. 
McDonald's brief, p. 33. 
Article XI, Section 5. 
£££. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985). 
Robert W. Swensen, MA Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II," 1985 Utah Law Review 1, 38. 
9 
Once created they take on a life of their own, proliferating and overlapping; disconnected 
from and independent of public interests or control. Their relevance is rarely re-examined 
as their bureaucracies grow- an ever increasing hinderance to popular authority. 
Salt Lake County poses the most serious problem. At least twelve full-function cities 
and towns exist in this county. Salt Lake County also engages in the municipal service 
delivery business. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose districts have been 
organized to duplicate municipal functions and complicate the local government puzzle: 
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of local government 
attempting to meet the needs of an area whose topography is uniform and 
whose population is constantly becoming more evenly distributed as 
suburbanization makes its rapid advance.37 
Bad government results from these policies: 
Are there any logical bases for dividing into special districts 
governmental functions and responsibilities in a relatively compact area such 
as the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, where nearly half of Utah's population 
is concentrated? A few examples from the report of the Local Government 
Survey Commission, which recently completed a factual study of local 
government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer. Unnecessary 
expenses are incurred because special districts employ their own legal counsel, 
thereby duplicating functions of the city or county attorney's office. Expenses 
are further increased because there is no central purchasing authority, and, 
consequently, none of the economies of large-scale purchasing are realized. 
Duplicate purchases of equipment and the necessary maintenance facilities 
as well as duplication of personnel also increase costs. Taxpayers in some 
instances are subject simultaneously to as many as five local government 
authorities. In such confusion taxpayers sometimes do not even receive the 
specific service the district is supposed to provide. For example, in the 
suburban areas southeast of Salt Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water 
from ten private water companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the 
same time are taxed by the Salt lake County Water Conservancy District, 
from which they receive no water. The compilers of the report felt that the 
latter situation was "close to double taxation," and the inequality of the 
situation does seem obvious."38 
6
 Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area," 7 Utah 
Law Review 209 (1960). 
3 8
 Id., at 212. 
10 
In 1979, the Utah Legislature adopted a statute which prohibits the County from 
approving urban development within one-half mile of a City's boimdaries. The purpose of 
this statute is to avoid double taxation and the proliferation of special districts.39 
The Legislature has also recognized that urban growth is critical to the economic 
welfare of our state.40 Development ordinarily occurs from the expansion of city 
boundaries. Through this means, vital services are brought to areas of growth potential or 
undergoing development impact. 
Because city services follow municipal annexation, actions which block the growth 
of city boundaries also retard municipal service delivery. Generally, where such services 
are stopped, orderly growth cannot occur. 
When Salt Lake County sponsors commercial development in unincorporated areas 
along the boarders of cities and in unincorporated islands, it permits such developers to 
avail themselves of lower County development standards and cheaper costs. However, 
because a city cannot annex so as to leave an island of unincorporated area, these 
commercial developments, which resist annexation, restrict growth along the entire length 
of a city boundary. 
When city growth is halted, so also is full and efficient municipal service delivery to 
many developing areas. If the urban development statute is not followed in its express 
terms, growth of cities throughout our state will be severely retarded, as all counties are 
d9
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-401 (3) states "[mjunidpal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with 
specific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban governmental services is needed and can be 
provided for the protection of public health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation and 
the proliferation of special service districts." Emphasis added. 
4 0
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-401(1). 
11 
then encouraged to follow Salt Lake County's example in competing with cities to lower 
development standards in exchange for tax base. 
The seriousness of the issue on appeal should not be trivialized as a petty political 
dispute. The implications of the court's decision are far too severe. 
3. McDonald's is not the Passive Developer Characterized by Appellees but is 
a Shopper for the Least Restrictive Laws. Such Actions Undermine 
Comprehensive Urban Planning and Should be Discouraged. 
McDonald's characterizes itself as an innocent citizen caught in a battle of 
jurisdictions. However, McDonald's is not the passive player it suggests. It can more 
accurately be characterized as a developer shopping between local governments for the 
least restrictive development standards. 
When developers are able to pit jurisdictions against one another to see which will 
offer the lowest development standard in exchange for tax base, comprehensive urban 
planning is destroyed. Uses of land, such as those of McDonald's, which do not conform 
to the comprehensive plans of the community, have been a source of deep concern to 
legislators and planners. These nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land-use 
controls and share responsibility for the blight which has infected many urban areas.41 
41
 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Second Edition, Volume 1, p. 357. 
12 
Municipal attorneys,42 urban planners,43 and law review commentators44 agree that 
nonconforming uses imperil the success of community plans and injure property values. 
Sandy City's own erratic boundaries are the best illustration of how comprehensive 
urban planning is undermined \tfien developers are permitted to shop between jurisdictions: 
SANDY CJTY BOUNDARY MAP 
HyiSLANDS TO BE ANNEXED IF PETITIONED 
yfy AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED IF PETITIONED 
H i IN DISPUTE 
4 2
 Messer, Non-conprming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in Action, p. 347 (1951). 
4 3
 Lewis, A New Zoning Han pr the District of Columbia, p. 112 (1956). 
44
 Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent Domain, BYU Journal of Legal Studies (19790, 
p. 151; Comment, 7 Bailor Law Review, p. 73 (1955); Comment, 102 University of Pennsylvania, p. 91 (1953); 
Comment, 1 Buffalo Law Review, p. 286 (1952); Comment, 9 University of Chicago Law Review, p. 477 (1942); 
Mendelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use; Judicial Restriction on the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Drake Law 
Review, p. 23 (1958); Norton, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses and Structures, 20 Law & Contemporary 
Problems, p. 305 (1955); O'Reilly, The Nonconforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 Georgetown Law 
Journal, p. 218 (1935); Young, Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 Western Reserve Law Review, 
p. 681 (1961). 
45
 Record at 25. 
13 
McDonald's has understandably acted in its self-interest in seeking out lower County 
standards. However, such actions vitiate legislative policy and statutes and destroy the 
City's capacity to meet its own urban service delivery responsibilities. The urban 
development statute was intended to encourage higher standards of urban development by 
prohibiting county development along city boimdaries. McDonald's should not be permitted 
to undermine that statute by posturing as innocence offended. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, this court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the loosing party - Sandy City.48 Contrary to this principle, appellees' briefs 
seem to suggest quite the opposite standard. They construe the evidence in the light most 
favorable to themselves. Such characterizations are fictional and should be rejected by the 
Court. 
POINT II 
UTAH LAW COUNTERS APPELLEES' 
LEGAL "AUTHORITIES" 
A. THERE IS NO 30-DAY LIMIT FOR BRINGING DISTRICT COURT ACTIONS 
The City's action seeks three types of relief: declaratory judgment,47 injunction,48 and 
extraordinary writ.49 State statutes do not provide a limitation period specific to these 
types of relief. 
McDonald's argues for a judicially imposed 30-day appeal period on all declaratory 
4b
 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
47
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-33-1. 
48
 Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4 9
 Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
14 
relief, injunctions, and extraordinary writs. Such a ruling would dramatically limit public 
access to the courts. The solitary authority posited by McDonald's for such a profound 
initiative is an 1980 Oregon Court of Appeals decision, Emerson v. Deschutes Co. Bd. of 
Commissioners™ in which a property owner allowed over 18 months to elapse before 
taking formal action to challenge preliminary approval of a subdivision. The applicable 
Oregon statute specifically limited the appellate review period to 60 days after preliminary 
plat approval. 
The property owner argued that he had not received notice of the subdivision 
approval and should not have been held to the 60-day appeal period. However, the court 
noted that he had still waited over a year after finally receiving notice before he petitioned 
for mandamus. Under these circumstances, the court refused to waive the 60-day statutory 
limitation saying "[w]e see no reason why this petitioner should be able to have more time 
to vindicate his rights after receiving actual notice of government action affecting those 
rights than does any other person challenging a local land use decision." 
McDonald's claims that "[t]he facts in Emerson dirt similar to those in this case." 
However, Emerson is distinguishable from this action in almost every respect: 
(1) Utah does not have a 60-day limitation period as Oregon does and Sandy 
violated no other statutory period of limitation. 
(2) The time period between McDonald's conditional use approval and initiation 
of this action is one-third the delay period in Emerson. 
(3) The petitioner in Emerson engaged in no formal action before or during his 
appeal period. However, in this case, the City had filed an action challenging the entire 
46 Or. App. 247, 610 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1980). 
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development bepre the McDonald's approval was even given.51 That action was pending 
at the time the McDonald's project was approved. 
(4) The developer in Emerson was the property owner at the time approval was 
given. In this action, McDonald's did not acquire the property until more than 4 months 
after approval was given. It concealed the earnest money offer it had made prior to that 
time and did not disclose its interest to the City after the purchase. 
(5) The petitioner in Emerson was aware of development work on the site during 
the period of delay but took no action. When Sandy City learned of work on the 
McDonald's site, it immediately moved for an injunction. When that failed to provide 
relief, the City petitioned the County Attorney to take action, pursuant to his statutory 
duties. 
It is surprising that McDonald's uses Emerson as its flagship case to justify a 
judicially created statute of limitations. The fact that the argument was made and the case 
was even mentioned, belies the weakness of McDonald's legal position. 
B. LACHES SHOULD NOT APPLY 
McDonald's relies on the case of Felix v. Supreme Court of County of Pima,52 for the 
proposition that a delay of five months and seven days in filing a petition for an 
extraordinary writ was unreasonable.53 McDonald's alleges a similar delay and prejudice 
in this action. 
The City filed its action challenging development on the entire 4.18 acres on November 6, 1987., 
McDonald's conditional use application was upheld and approved by the County Commission on December 9„ 
1987. 
5 2
 92 Ariz. 247, 375 P.2d 730. 
5 3
 McDonald's brief at 16-17. 
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McDonald's misstates the Felix decision. The period of delay was not the focus of 
the Court's decision - it acknowledged that "[o]ur statutes and rules do not limit the time 
within which a petition for certiorari may be filed." It was the petitioner's inaction during 
that period which caused the court to quash the writ of certiorari: 
Laches is a question not merely of the running of time, but also of the 
intervening change of position of one of the parties induced by the inaction 
of the party against whom the defense is raised. Construction of the steel 
tower by respondent during a period when petitioner made no efprt to obtain 
review of the order of immediate possession, and no attempt to prevent this 
construction, amounted to such a change of position by respondent. 54 
In the instant action, the Sandy City made every effort to prevent project 
construction. It had filed an action challenging the entire development bepre the 
McDonald's approval was even given.55 When it learned that construction was proceeding, 
it immediately moved for an injunction. When these measures failed, the City petitioned 
the county attorney to take action, pursuant to his statutory duties. When he refused, this 
action was filed. 
The court in Felix emphasized that to vacate the order of occupancy in that case 
would require the condemnor to dismantie the structure it had erected on the land, only 
to erect it again within a matter of months when the eminent domain proceedings were 
completed. There is no evidence that such injury or irrationality attends the instant action. 
The foregoing facts expose the misapplication of the Felix decision to this action. 
McDonald's creative interpretation of that case should be rejected by the court. 
Citations omitted. Emphasis added. 
5 5
 The City filed its action challenging development on the entire 4.18 acres on November 6, 1987. 
McDonald's conditional use application was upheld and approved by the County Commission on December 9, 
1987. 
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C COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WAS APPLIED PREMATURELY 
Judge Uno ruled that Chevron's development did not constitute "urban 
development," that Sandy did not clearly state that it would annex the subject property, that 
the projected cost of the Chevron project was under $750,000, and that the Chevron 
application should be considered as a single development, separate from the remainder of 
the property.56 
McDonald's and the County rely on Judge Uno's decision to assert collateral 
estoppel.57 They contend that the City is precluded from rehtigating its willingness to annex 
or the value of the McDonald's project, because these issues were determined on the merits 
in the Chevron Action. 
Judge Uno's decision was appealed by the City and the Court of Appeals has now 
ruled.58 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County™ was filed June 7,1990, and bears directly on the 
issue of collateral estoppel. A copy of that decision is attached hereto as Appendix "A" 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's findings against Sandy City on the issues of 
project cost and willingness to annex, but it assigned a totally different rationale than that 
used by the trial court.60 
The City respectfully petitioned for rehearing that decision in part because the 
principle issues on which the court reached its determination had not been briefed or 
Record at 199. 
McDonald's brief, p. 20; County brief, p. 9. 
The appeal was sent to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court under its Hpour over" authority. 
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
/d., at 44. 
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argued. A copy of the City's Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix "B." 
The basis for the City's petition was that the Court had avoided the merits of the action 
based on a misunderstanding of the facts and standard of review. The principle basis of the 
appeal court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative defense by any of the parties to the 
action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered by the parties, the agencies, or lower 
court. Thus, the parties were entirely deprived of the opportunity to address the issue upon 
which the decision was made. 
The bar of collateral estoppel is not applicable where an action was not determined 
on the merits or where the case was not completely, fully and fairly litigated.61 Under the 
circumstances, McDonald's reliance on the Chevron decision is premature and misplaced. 
D. MCDONALD'S FIXTURES HAVE BECOME PART OF THE REALTY 
AND WERE APPROPRIATELY APPRAISED AS A COST OF DEVELOPMENT. 
Sandy introduced, both before the County and the District Court, an appraisal by a 
licensed MAI showing costs of development exceeded $750,000. McDonald's argues that 
the expert was qualified only in real estate appraising and should not have been entitled 
to estimate costs or values of the building fixtures. McDonald's further contends that the 
fixtures should not be considered as a cost of development in any case. 
McDonald's seeks to limit the real estate appraisal and cost estimates to the bare 
shell of the building. That shell was described at hearing as follows: 
"A typical developer goes in and ties up a piece of property and builds a building 
delivers to the tenants, what is called a white box, sheet rocked walls, dropped 
ceilings and cement floors, this is the kind of shell that McDonald's will be delivering 
to the franchise, it is the franchisee's responsibility to bring that property up to 
operating capabilities, putting in their own fixtures, signs, etc. . . "62 
County brief, p. 9. 
Record at 41. 
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McDonald's construction of what constitutes real estate and development costs is not 
consistent with Utah law. In order to ascertain whether an improvement has been made 
to real estate, courts look to whether there has been an annexation to the land, or to some 
part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it, and whether it was done with the intention 
of making it a permanent part thereof.63 
McDonald's suggestion that an MAI is only qualified to appraise "shells" and "white 
boxes," is not consistent with Utah law which includes true fixtures as a part of realty. At 
hearings before the County Commission, counsel for both McDonald's and Salt Lake 
County repeatedly referred to these improvements as "fixtures" and "fixture costs."64 This 
is undoubtedly because they are necessary to make the building "operational."65 Salt Lake 
County appraises improvements as part of its tax appraisals on our homes and other red 
property. It seems to consider itself to have the exclusive right to consider the value of 
fixtures to real estate. 
McDonald's and the County should not be permitted to alternate between restrictive 
and expansive standards of real estate appraisal, simply to maximize their tax revenues. In 
all cases, where improvements have been affixed to property in order to render it 
operational, such fixtures should be included in the costs of development. 
E. WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED 
McDonald's contends that the City had failed to express a "willingness" to annex the 
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 111 P2d 1100,1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Record at 39, 43. 
Record at 41, quoted above. 
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subject property because "Sandy has not submitted any facts to support that conclusion."66 
Assuming arguendo that such a declaration is required, the recent decision by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in the Chevron case refutes that argument. The appeal court recognized 
that the City had posed at least two bases on which to show flwillingness:" (1) promulgating 
a general policy declaration indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioned, 
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission that it was willing to annex the property."67 
The evidence referenced by the court of appeals was before the district court in this 
action. The record in this action discloses a third occasion when the City declared its 
willingness to annex At a hearing, held by Sandy to consider development of this site, the 
City directly and publicly reiterated its willingness to annex the entire 4.18 acre tract: 
"When the Chairman of the Planning Commission asked a representative of Sandy 
City if they were willing to annex this into the City, they said yes they were . . . "68 
McDonald's representation that no willingness was expressed offends the express 
language of the statute which requires no such expression. It also contradicts the record 
on appeal which demonstrates three discrete occasions when the City publicly declared its 
willingness. Representations to the contrary by McDonald's cannot be supported legally or 
factually and should not be entertained. 
F. MASTER PLAN COMPLIANCE HAS NOT BEEN MET 
Salt Lake County cites Garland v. Salt Lake County** for the rule that it need not 
McDonald's brief, p. 29. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Record at 41. Testimony of DeLynn Yeates, the property owner and developer. 
358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961). 
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comply with its own master plan for the area.70 That case confirms only that a State of 
Utah statute does not require that a master plan be adopted before zoning ordinances can 
be passed. The state statute reviewed in Garland is not at issue here. In the instant action, 
the County's master plan had already been adopted. Further, the County's own ordinance 
specifically requires compliance with the master plan. That ordinance states as follows: 
"The planning commission shall not authorize a conditional use permit unless 
the evidence presented is such as to establish . . . [t]hat the proposed use will 
conform to the intent of the county master plan."71 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of an agency of government to 
conform its official actions to its own regulations is arbitrary and capricious. The Court has 
said: 
Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely "guidelines," but 
administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and 
cannot be ignored by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence 
of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not 
following its rules, an agency must be held to them.72 
The County's failure to require evidence of compliance with its master plan, in the 
face of clear evidence of noncompliance, was the essence of capriciousness and is the cause 
of this otherwise unnecessary legal action. It should not be permitted to avoid its ordinance 
obligations by diverting the Court to the distinctly different issue of its enabling powers 
under state statute. 
70
 County brief, p. 18. 
71
 Record at 33. County Ordinance 19.84.090. 
7 2
 State, Etc. v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Ut. 1980). 
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G. PLANNING COMMISSION FINDINGS SHOULD NOT BE 
DETERMINATIVE OF THIS ACTION 
McDonald's cites Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Employment Sec.,7Z for the 
proposition that this Court should defer to the Planning Commission's findings. It contends 
that such deference is justified when the question is technical "calling for the special 
expertise of the agency."74 
The qualifications of the County Planning Commission are set by statute. Each 
commissioner must be a resident of the County and an owner of property therein.75 No 
other qualifications are required and the record does not described any other actual 
qualifications. Accordingly, there is no evidence of expertise to which deference could be 
extended. 
Statutory authority of the County to approve urban development is the central issue 
in this case. Jurisdictional issues are not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper 
place where the County lacks authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that 
review latitude is recognized only where counties act within their authority. 
County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the 
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny 
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the 
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is 
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong 
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will 
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an 
abuse of discretion.76 
™ 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982). 
74
 McDonald's brief, p. 25, 27. 
75
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-2. 
76
 Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also, Peatross v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted 
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its 
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This Court acts as a check on excesses of governmental power. The review standard 
posed by respondents reverses that role. Instead of serving as a check on governmental 
excesses, it becomes the validator of the same. It permits administrative agencies, without 
apparent expertise or qualification, to define their own powers in the face of evidence 
which consistently denies them such powers. The City respectfully requests that the Court 
not accept the review standard so broadly posed by McDonald's and the County. 
CONCLUSION 
This reply is intended to be brief in order to minimize the volume of materials 
before the Court. However, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, its is respectfully 
submitted that the factual and legal inadequacies in the arguments posited in Appellees' 
briefs require written response. When placed in the light of the actual facts and law, such 
arguments underscore the existence of issues of fact which require adequate development. 
Discovery is the appropriate means to resolve such issues. Summary judgment should be 
vacated in order that discovery may proceed. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of July, 1990. 
^ • / ^ ^ 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
authority." 
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Sandy City, a municipal 
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v. 
Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission; K. Delyn 
Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. 
Scott Kjar; Steven E. Smoot; 
Postero-Blecker/ Inc.; and 
Chevron U.S.A./ Inc.# 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
ry T. Nocrwfn 
k of tru C o u f 
Ute^. Court •* AofKfc*!^  
Case No. 880429-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Attorneys: Walter R. Miller/ Sandy, for Appellant 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt Lake City/ for Appellees 
Yeates/ Priest/ Kjar# Smoot and Postero-Blecker/ 
Inc. 
Leonard J. Lewis/ Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Chevron U.S.A./ Inc. 
Kent S. Lewis/ Salt Lake City# for Appellee Salt 
Lake County 
Before Judges Bench/ Garff# and Jackson. 
GARFF/ Judge: 
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's dismissal 
of its action against defendants Salt Lake County, property 
owners Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot, and developers 
Postero-Blecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron USA, Inc. 
(Chevron). We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Sandy 
City.'s action. 
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of commercial 
property located on the northwest corner of 10600 South and 
1300 East in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The property 
abuts Sandy Cityfs boundaries and is located within an 
unincorporated "island" within Sandy City's limits. Since 
1976, the county master plan and Sandy City plans have called 
for rural residential uses of the property* 
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general annexation policy 
declaration which, among other things, delineated twenty-one 
unincorporated islands within the city boundaries which Sandy 
City was willing to annex, including the present parcel. 
According to Sandy City, this policy declaration requires 
property owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy City, 
thereby obviating the County's approval for development of 
commercial property when the development cost is in excess of 
$750,000. 
On August 5, 1987, at the property owners* request, the 
Salt Lake County Commission, without amending its master plan, 
adopted a zoning ordinance which permitted commercial 
development on the present property. Sandy City objected to 
the rezoning but failed to appeal the decision.^ 
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, the agent for the 
property owners and Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a 
conditional use permit to build a Chevron service station, car 
wash, and mini-convenience store on .7 acres of the property. 
This application indicated that the estimated value of the 
project was $250,000. The property owners also intended to 
build a McDonald's restaurant on the property. On September 
30, 1987, they filed another conditional use permit application 
which valued the McDonald's project at approximately $300,000. 
The property owners did not petition to annex the property to 
Sandy City. 
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City protested the Chevron 
application, indicating that "Sandy City is currently 
considering annexation of the property and the annexation will 
require an independent consideration of proper zoning for this 
property." It also unsuccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1987), an appeal from a 
zoning decision must be made within the time and according to 
the procedure specified by the board of county commissioners. 
While these regulations are not a part of this record, there is 
no dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezoning 
pursuant to these regulations. 
County Commission to reconsider and amend its previously passed 
zoning ordinance• 
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission approved the Chevron conditional use application. 
On October 14, 1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. The 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, following several public 
hearings, denied Sandy City's appeal and entered findings of 
fact. 
Sandy City then appealed the conditional use decision to 
the Salt Lake County Commission, which held a hearing on 
December 9, 1987. The Salt Lake County Commission affirmed the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission's grant of the Chevron 
conditional use permit, finding that the required statutory 
procedure had been followed and that the grant of the 
conditional use permit was in the community's interest. Sandy 
City then brought this action in the district court. 
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake County filed with the 
district court the affidavit of Helen Christiansen, the Salt 
Lake Planning Commission's administrative assistant, and the 
minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission's September 
22 and October 13, 1987 meetings, at which Chevron's 
conditional use permit application had been discussed and 
interested parties had presented evidence. Subsequently, Sandy 
City submitted an affidavit indicating that the projected cost 
of the Chevron development was between $660,000 to $760,000, 
and that the cost of the McDonald's development would be 
between $900,000 and $1,100,000. Simultaneously, Salt Lake 
County submitted the minutes of the April 28, 1987 meeting of 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, which involved 
discussion of the zoning change, along with Helen 
Christiansen's authenticating affidavit. All parties moved for 
summary judgment. 
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake County's 
affidavits, alleging that they failed to conform to the 
requirements of rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Chevron responded by filing an affidavit indicating 
that the building value of the proposed Chevron station was 
$175,000. 
On February 4, 1988, the day before the hearing on Salt 
Lake County's motion for summary judgment, Sandy City's 
attorney moved for additional discovery time pursuant to rule 
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
During the hearing on February 5, 1988, Salt Lake County 
requested permission to introduce into evidence the certified 
record of the administrative hearings. These records included 
the previously submitted commission minutes, with additional 
maps and supporting materials. Sandy City's counsel objected, 
stating that he did not know what the administrative record 
contained and, thus, the record was prejudicial. The district 
court overruled Sandy City's objection and allowed the record 
to be entered into evidence. On February 19, 1988, Salt Lake 
County submitted the minutes of the December 9, 1987 meeting of 
the Salt Lake County Commission, containing the appeal of the 
conditional use permit grant, along with the administrative 
assistant's supporting affidavit. 
Salt Lake County filed the complete certified 
administrative record with the district court on March 3, 
1988. On March 15, 1988, the district court entered its 
decision, finding that the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
had properly issued the conditional use permit, and that 
defendants' actions did not violate the annexation statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986). It granted summary judgment 
in favor of defendants and dismissed Sandy City's action. 
Subsequently, Sandy City unsuccessfully moved for an injunction 
on the development of the property during the pendency of the 
appeal. It then brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Sandy City challenges the summary judgment, 
first arguing that there were substantial issues of material 
fact making summary judgment improper because: (1) Salt Lake 
County untimely submitted the adminstrative record in violation 
of rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt 
Lake County's administrative record and affidavits were 
untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (3) the affidavits and other evidence 
presented by Chevron violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate evidentiary foundation; 
(4) the trial court erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's 
rule 56(f) motion for further discovery; and (5) there were 
substantial issues of material fact in the record. Sandy 
City's second major assignment of error is that the trial court 
erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-418 and 
10-1-4(11) (1986) by ruling that (1) to preclude urban 
development of the property at issue, Sandy City had to 
formally declare its intention to annex it prior to the 
occurrence of the events leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the 
Chevron development, and possibly the McDonald's development, 
did not constitute "urban development" under section 10-1-4(11). 
I. FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Before we address Sandy Cityfs contentions, however, it 
is necessary to examine the scope of our review in cases 
dealing with summary judgment and municipal zoning issues.2 
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court 
"consider[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirm[s] only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, 
even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.H 
BriQQS v, Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)* 
It is well established in Utah that "courts of law cannot 
substitute their judgment in the area of zoning regulations for 
that of the [municipality*s] governing body.H Navlor v. Salt 
Lake Citv Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 29 (1965) 
(footnote omitted)* Instead, the courts afford a comparatively 
wide latitude of discretion to administrative bodies charged 
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as endowing their 
actions with a presumption of correctness and validity, because 
of the complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning 
and the specialized knowledge of the administrative body. 
Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 
138, 140 (Utah 1979). Thus, the courts will not consider the 
wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise interfere with 
a zoning determination unless "it is shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Id. 
In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1986) 
indicates that an aggrieved party may "maintain a plenary 
action for relief" from any decision of the municipal body 
within thirty days of the filing of the decision. .The Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he statutory language 'plenary 
action for relief therefrom' presupposes the continued 
existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an 
appeal rather than a trial #e novo." Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). However, "[t]he 
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes and 
characterizes some of the issues as annexation-related, however 
this appeal is from the grant of a conditional use permit, a 
zoning function. 
nature and extent of the review depends on what happened below 
as reflected by a true record of the proceedings/ viewed in the 
light of accepted due process requirements." Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R. Co, v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 
Utah 2d 105/ 287 P.2d 884/ 887 (1955). The supreme court also 
found/ in Xanthos, that where a hearing has proceeded in 
accordance with due process requirements/ the reviewing court 
can look only to the record/ which consists of the hearing 
minutes along with the formal findings and order. Xanthos, 685 
P.2d at 1034. However/ where no record is preserved/ and there 
is, consequently/ nothing to review# the reviewing court may 
take evidence. Id. While this evidence is not necessarily 
limited to the evidence presented below# the reviewing court 
may not retry the case on the merits or substitute its judgment 
for that of the municipal body. Id. 
Because an administrative record has been preserved in 
the present circumstance/ we find that this matter should be 
reviewed on the record/ and that a de novo trial is 
inappropriate. 
Under these standards of review# we now examine Sandy 
City's claims that the trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment on evidentiary issues. 
A. Admission of Administrative Record 
First/ Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake County untimely 
submitted the administrative record in violation of rule 6(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that rule 6(d) 
requires supporting affidavits to be submitted at the time a 
party files a motion for summary judgment/ and that the 
administrative record is analogous to a supporting affidavit. 
Because the County submitted the administrative record during 
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment/ rather than 
beforehand/ and/ consequently/ failed to give Sandy City notice 
of the contents of the record/ Sandy City concludes that the 
trial court should not have considered the evidence contained 
in this record in arriving Aat its summary judgment. On the 
other hand/ the County argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not set forth any specific procedure for certifying an 
administrative record from a county commission to the district 
court/ so rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals only 
with the filing of affidavits. 
In relevant part/ rule 6(d) states: 
When a motion is supported by an 
affidavit/ the affidavit shall be served 
with the motion; and# except as otherwise 
provided in Rule 59(c)# opposing 
affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing/ unless the court 
permits them to be served at some other 
time. 
Prior to the hearing before the district court on 
February 5/ 1988/ the County submitted the minutes of the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission hearings held on April 28, May 
12/ September 22/ October 13# and October 27/ 1987/ along with 
authenticating affidavits• These minutes contained testimony 
on all of the disputed issues. The record which the County 
moved to be placed into evidence during the district court 
hearing contained these minutes/ accompanied by some 
documentation and a large quantity of plat maps# but did not 
add materially to the relevant information already before the 
court. The court admitted this record into evidence over the 
strenuous objections of Sandy City# stating that "everything 
down there is not essential to a determination of these 
motions. And I think that quite apart from this# [even] if the 
court disregarded this# it will have before it sufficient 
undisputed facts of law to make decisions in the matter." 
Subsequently, the court admitted into evidence/ as part of the 
record/ the minutes of the Salt Lake County Commission hearing 
held on December 9, 1987/ which had not previously been 
available/ and various documents that were specifically 
requested by Sandy City's attorney. 
Our review of the record/ including the administrative 
record submitted to the court/ indicates that if there was any 
error in admitting the administrative record/ it was harmless 
because it was essentially cumulative with respect to the 
evidence already before the court. Further/ some of the 
subsequently admitted evidence was admitted at Sandy City's 
request. 
However# we find that the trial court did not err in 
admitting the administrative record at the time of trial. If 
we follow rule 6(d) literally/ styling the administrative 
record as the equivalent of an affidavit in support of a motion 
for summary judgment/ the documents must be served not later 
than one day before the hearing unless the court permits them 
to be served at some other time. The court/ therefore/ has 
discretion to admit such documents at other times, including 
during the hearing. In this case, the court admitted documents 
during and after the hearing, in response to requests made by 
both parties. 
However, there are limitations to this discretion. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has found that the notice 
provisions of rule 6(d) are not hard and fast, it has stated 
that a trial court may dispense with technical compliance to 
them only if there is satisfactory proof that a party had 
"actual notice and time to prepare to meet the questions raised 
by the motion of an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co, v. Blomcruist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 
373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962). 
Although Sandy City objected to the admission of the 
administrative record on the ground that it did not know what 
it contained and, therefore, was unprepared to argue against 
it, the trial court properly denied this objection because the 
entire record was a matter of public record, had been on file 
for a substantial period of time prior to the hearing, and both 
parties had access to it. Further, significant portions of the 
record, in the form of the commission minutes, were already 
before the court and Sandy City had ample opportunity to become 
familiar with them. We find no abuse of discretion in the 
courtfs ruling. 
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation 
Sandy City's next claim of error is that the affidavits 
and other evidence presented by Chevron and the other 
defendants violate rule 56 of. the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because they lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation. 
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that 
H[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Inadmissible 
evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, D & L Supply V. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1989); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins, Co,, 771 P.2d 
693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which does not 
meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is subject to a motion to 
strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 
64, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blomauist, 504 P.2d 
at 1020-21 (an affidavit containing statements made only "on 
information and belief is insufficient and will be 
disregarded). 
Sandy City moved to strike defendants' affidavits for 
their failure to conform to these requirements. In its motion 
to strike, Sandy City attacked defendant Chevron's memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment and the affidavit 
of Helen J. Christiansen, along with its attached exhibits, to 
the extent that they were used to establish the allegations set 
forth in Chevron's memorandum, 
Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to establish 
that she was the custodian of the record before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission and that, on the basis of her 
personal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a copy of 
McDonald's Corporation's application for a conditional use 
permit were the correct records of the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission. Under rules 902(4) and 1005 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, public records are admissible as an 
exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence if 
they are "certified as correct by the custodian." Utah R. 
Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christiansen's affidavit 
conformed to rule 56(e) with regard to the admission of the 
exhibits as portions of the administrative record before the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission. As such, they are 
admissible evidence and are not subject to a motion to strike. 
Sandy City challenges various statements made in these 
minutes as being without evidentiary foundation. These 
allegations, however, go to the merits of granting the 
conditional use permit and not to any procedural defects. 
Therefore, we are not concerned with them under our standard of 
review. Consequently, we find Sandy City's objections to the 
foundation of statements made in the record to be without merit. 
C. Further Discovery 
Sandy City argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to permit it to conduct further discovery pursuant to 
rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(f) 
provides that a court may continue a motion for summary 
judgment to permit the moving party to obtain affidavits or 
take depositions. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 
1990). Rule 56(f) reads as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition 
the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
It is generally held that rule 56(f) motions should be 
granted liberally to provide adequate opportunity for 
discovery/ Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311/ 313 (Utah 1984)t 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838/ 841 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); because information gained during discovery may 
create genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275/ 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However/ courts are unwilling 
to -spare the litigants from their own lack of diligence/" 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 
218/ 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule 56(f) motions 
when dilatory or lacking in merit. Reeves v. Geiav 
Pharmaceutical, Inc.. 764 P.2d 636/ 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Downtown Athletic Club. 740 P.2d at 278-79. 
A rule 56(f) movant must file an affidavit to preserve 
his or her contention that summary judgment should be delayed 
pending further discovery. Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. In this 
affidavit/ the movant must explain how the requested 
continuance will aid his or her opposition to summary 
judgment. Id. The trial court has discretion to determine 
whether the reasons stated in a rule 56(f) affidavit are 
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. 
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court along with 
its rule 56(f) motion/ stating that it had been unable to take 
defendants1 depositions or to obtain a certified copy of 
certain county commission minutes. It indicated that it wanted 
to pursue additional discovery which would show that: (1) the 
proposed use of the property contradicted the county master 
plan and that insufficient evidence had been presented to the 
County Planning Commission to demonstrate conformity with the 
plan; (2) the proposed zoning would not contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3) the proposed use 
would be detrimental to the health/ safety/ and general welfare 
of persons residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope/ costs/ 
and impact of the development was not accurately and fully 
communicated to the county officials during the decision-making 
process; and (5) the costs.of the development would 
substantially exceed $750,000. 
To determine whether this affidavit was sufficient to 
merit a rule 56(f) continuance, several factors must have been 
considered: 
(1) Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the 
party against whom summary judgment is 
sought merely on a "fishing expedition" 
for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant 
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient time 
since the inception of the lawsuit for the 
party against whom the summary judgment is 
sought to use discovery procedures, and 
thereby cross-examine the moving party? 
(3) If discovery procedures were timely 
initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639; 
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 278. 
In determining if Sandy City's request for further 
discovery was meritorious, we first consider the relevant 
standard of review. As we noted above, in municipal zoning 
decisions, the courts do not consider the wisdom, necessity, or 
advisability of particular actions. See Sandv Citv v. Citv of 
South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the 
reviewing court may consider whether the municipality acted in 
conformance with its enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant 
to its comprehensive plan. * Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 16 
Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (1965). The court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the municipality on the 
merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129. 
The trial record contained evidence as to Salt Lake 
County's enabling statutes, ordinances, and plans. It also 
indicated that the Salt Lake County Commission considered 
evidence with respect to all the issues on which Sandy City 
wished to perform additional discovery. The Salt Lake County 
Commission made findings of fact going to the merits of these 
issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the issues was 
improper under the standard of review# but could properly be 
held with respect to enabling statutes and procedural issues. 
However, there was already substantial evidence on the record 
regarding the relevant enabling statutes and plans. Further, 
Sandy City did not allege in its affidavit that it needed 
additional time to discover procedural errors committed by Salt 
Lake County in granting the conditional building permit. 
Therefore/ we find that the trial court could reasonably 
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings state# in part: 
1. The estimated cost of the 
development is approximately $175,000 
. . . . 
2. This development is consistent 
with the intent of the Salt Lake 
County Master Plan by placing 
commercial development at major 
intersections within the county. The 
Little Cottonwood District Plan was 
generally intended to be applicable 
through 1985 and the map is now 
outdated in this immediate area. 
Since the adoption of the plan in 
1976/ Sandy City rezoned the 
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300 
East to commercial/ which changed the 
character of the intersection. 
Additional commercial development is 
now appropriate at this intersection 
and is consistent with the existing 
development approved by Sandy City. 
3. The development will provide 
additional gasoline services which 
are needed and desirable in the 
neighborhood and community. . . . 
4. The development is buffered from 
adjacent residential uses by property 
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental 
to the health/ safety or general 
welfare of persons residing or 
working in the vicinity or injurious 
to property or improvements in the 
vicinity. The traffic engineer has 
reviewed and approved the 
application. Upon compliance with 
the conditions required by the 
Planning Commission, the development 
will be an attractive addition to the 
community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with 
the regulation and conditions of the 
Zonina Ordinance. 
conclude that the reasons Sandy City articulated in its 
affidavit would produce only cumulative evidence and# so, were 
inadequate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f)* 
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and opportunity 
during the pendency of the action before the county commissions 
to develop and present evidence in its favor and to determine 
and refute the defendants0 evidence. The record indicates that 
on August 5, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission adopted the 
zoning ordinance allowing commercial development on the 
property at issue, following hearings on the issue held in 
April and May of 1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at 
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26, 1987, 
Postero-Blecker applied for the Chevron conditional use 
permit. Sandy City protested the application on September 18, 
1987, and subsequently was involved in several public hearings 
on the issue before both the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it had 
ample opportunity to present evidence. Sandy City appealed'to 
the district court in December 1987. The hearing on the 
summary judgment motion was finally held on February 5, 1988, 
nearly a year after the initial zoning hearings had taken 
place. As stated previously, the court will not use a rule 
56(f) motion to shield the movant from his or her lack of 
diligence. 
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion, 
[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowledge 
or control of the facts by the moving 
party is not adequate: the opposing party 
must show to the best of his ability what 
facts are within the movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control; what steps have been 
taken to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures under the 
Rules; and that he is desirous of taking 
advantage of these discovery procedures. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. Moore, W. Taggart & 
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 
1987)). Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with these 
requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule 56(f) 
motion. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Sandy City argues that the court failed to consider 
evidence which created the following genuine issues of material 
fact: (1) Sandy City's willingness to annex, as shown by its 
express declaration in its annexation policy declaration and 
its attorney's statements before the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission; (2) that the projected cost of the Chevron project 
exceeded $750,000, as shown by a certified appraisal setting 
the cost as between $660,000 and $760,000; (3) that the Chevron 
station was only part of a larger scheme to develop the 
4.18-acre parcel# in that the Chevron station would take only 
1/6 of the parcel, the property owners' represented that the 
property would be a "commercial subdivision/" and that they 
would be the sole developers of the entire tract; (4) that the 
cost for the entire development/ excluding the cost of the 
land/ would exceed $750/000; and (5) the development was not in 
compliance with the county master plan and county ordinances 
which called for rural use of the subject property/ and would 
create traffic hazards and planning problems. 
Many of these issues are actually issues of law. The 
only issues of fact are the projected cost of the project and 
whether the proposed development was in compliance with the 
county master plan and county ordinances. As we have noted 
above, these issues were discussed and evidence was presented 
before the county commissions/ which entered written findings 
and decided them on their merits. Because their findings were 
supported by evidence/ we do not disturb them on review. See 
USX Corp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883/ 885-86 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (administrative agency's factual findings will not 
be disturbed unless they are -arbitrary and capricious"). 
II. LEGAL ISSUES 
We next address Sandy City's contention that the trial 
court erred in its interpretation and application of Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) and § 10-1-4(11) (1986). Because 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than 
fact/ the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial 
court's legal conclusions.. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8/ 9 (1989) (per curiam); Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. 
Graystone Pines Homeowner's Ass'n, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 
(Ct. App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990). 
A. Annexation Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 prohibits urban development 
"within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated 
territory which the municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development 
under the standards and requirements set forth in this 
chapter." (Emphasis added.) The parties disagree as to 
whether Sandy City, to prevent urban development in the 
disputed territory, was required under this statute to formally 
declare its intention to annex the territory prior to the 
events leading to this lawsuit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 (1986) requires a municipality, 
prior to annexing unincorporated territory of more than five 
acres, to adopt a policy declaration indicating the standard 
under which it is willing to annex the territory. Sandy City 
argues that it expressly declared its willingness to annex the 
property before initiation of the present lawsuit by (1) 
promulgating a general policy declaration indicating its 
willingness to annex the property, if petitioned, along with 
twenty other parcels; and (2) its counsel*s direct statement to 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission that it was willing to 
annex the property. The trial court found that Sandy City was 
obliged to make a formal declaration of intent to annex, in 
addition to its general policy declaration, to invoke the 
protection of section 10-2-414. 
Even though Sandy City, in its master policy declaration, 
had indicated its interest in annexing the property should the 
property owners so petition, the property owners never 
petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to annex the property on 
its own. Further, it did not appeal the county's initial 
zoning decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-9 (1986), and 
raise this issue at that time. Instead, it waited to raise the 
issue on the subsequent grant of the conditional use permit, 
where the relevant issues do not include the proposed use of 
the land or any annexation issue, but only whether the proposed 
use comports with the previously enacted zoning regulations and 
county master plan. Because Sandy City could and should have 
raised this issue earlier, we find that it is precluded from 
raising it now. See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 
1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not address 
the issue of whether Sandy City was required under section 
10-2-418, in addition to its master policy declaration, to 
officially declare its willingness to annex a territory of less 
than five acres.4 Consequently, we find Sandy City's 
objection to be without merit. 
4. We note that the property at issue consists of 4.18 acres 
while section 10-2-418 applies to parcels consisting of at 
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2-418 would be 
inapplicable in the present case. 
We affirm the trial courtfs finding against Sandy City on 
this issue, even though we assign a totally different rationale 
than that used by the trial court. See, e.g., Ostler v. 
Ostler. 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Urban Development 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) states that -[u]rban 
development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half 
mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration.M "Urban development" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdivision involving more 
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre 
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial development 
for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all 
phases." 
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the proposed 
development of the disputed territory/ Sandy City argues that 
the trial court erred in finding the value of the proposed 
development did not exceed $750/000 because (1) the definition 
of ••urban development" under section 10-1-104 includes not only 
the value of the building itself/ but also the cost of the land 
and the value of the building fixtures; and (2) the $750/000 
figure encompasses all commercial ventures to be built on the 
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the other hand/ 
alleges that the only relevant cost under the definition is 
that of the building alone and does not include the land and 
building fixtures, and that the $750/000 figure applies to each 
individual development venture separately initiated on the 
property. 
Again, because Sandy City has not made any attempt to 
annex the territory and should have raised its objections to 
urban development at the time of the zoning determination 
rather than at the subsequent granting of a conditional use 
permit, we decline to interpret this statute. Because the 
interpretation of section LO-2-414 would have no relevance to 
the propriety of the county's grant of a conditional use permit 
under our standard of review, any interpretation we would make 
would be an advisory opinion/ which we decline to issue under 
well established standards of judicial review. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (where the result in the prior action constitutes the 
full relief available to the parties on the same claim/ or 
where the issue could and should have been litigated in the 
prior action, the claim is precluded under the doctrine of res 
judicata); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 33 (Ct, 
App. 1990) (there is a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to 
avoid a^ yiecgry opinions), therefore, we find this issue to be 
wii" 
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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION 
The City is appreciative of the attention and courtesy extended by the court to the 
parties at oral argument. However, the court's Opinion, filed one year thereafter, departs 
from both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied upon by the lower court. The 
passage of time and this detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted 
in several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, should materially alter this court's 
opinion. 
These errors are not merely technical. They form the basis upon which the merits 
of the entire action were avoided. They are thus fundamental to the rights of the parties. 
They also involve important public policy as set forth more fully herein. Correction of these 
errors will promote principles of justice, sound development and local governance. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court review the statutes and case law and 
apply them to the actual record as discussed herein, and to grant appellant the opportunity 
for oral argument on such issues as are presented in this petition, as provided in Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH ZONING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTES 
HAVE BEEN MISAPPREHENDED 
A THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE 
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND TO APPLY A 
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO STATUTES OF THAT 
CLASS. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area 
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration." 
"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for 
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."1 
This statute limits Salt Lake County's jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject 
matter. It expressly forbids the County to "approve or permit" commercial development in 
excess of $750,000 within one-half mile of Sandy City. County ordinances also prohibit the 
County from approving use permits which contradict the master plan.2 
A central issue in Sandy City's appeal from summary judgment by the district court 
is whether respondents' development exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the 
County of approval authority. The County Director of Development Services, testifying 
before the Planning Commission, confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will 
exceed the $750,000 figure."3 Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that 
their costs for just the first two pads was $760,000.4 A later MAI appraisal showed that the 
costs of the entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development 
restriction.5 
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this 
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. But, Salt Lake County is 
subject to the same tendencies as other large bureaucracies — it seeks to maximize its own 
interests and authority. Despite the testimony of the developers and its own staff, it found 
1
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986). 
2R22. 
3
 Ri l l . 
4
 R108. 
5
 R133-135. 
2 
that development costs were less than $750,000. 
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that it could consider whether the County 
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.6 It 
cited Na)lor v. Salt Lake City Corporation7 for the proposition that the court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue. 
The Naylor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of the 
City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he statutory 
authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and amending the same 
is not questioned" in that case.8 Thus the Naylor court merely confirmed that courts should 
not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative discretion. 
Statutory authority is the central issue in the instant appeal. Jurisdictional issues are 
not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks 
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized only 
where counties act within their authority: 
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the 
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny 
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the 
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is 
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong 
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will 
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an 
abuse of discretion."9 
6
 Opinion, p. 11. 
7
 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965). 
8
 Id., at p. 28. 
9
 Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted 
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its 
authority." 
3 
There is hardly a more important issue before any court than the unlawful use of 
governmental power. Courts have been established to check such excesses. Salt Lake 
County and its planning commission are agencies of limited jurisdiction. Their "authority" 
is dependent entirely upon the terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot 
confer jurisdiction on themselves by making findings contrary to the evidence before them. 
If the mandatory provisions of their enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority 
to proceed. 
The review standard applied in this appeal reverses the proper role of the courts. 
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, it becomes the validator of the 
same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of evidence 
which consistently denies them such powers. The Court of Appeals could not have 
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests that 
the court reconsider the review standard it so broadly applied in this appeal. 
B. THE MUNICIPAL CODE AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES 
RELIED ON BY THE COURT HAVE NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER TO 
REZONINGS BY ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS. 
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code and one statute 
from the enabling act for counties, as the basis for its refusal to review the merits of this 
appeal.10 These statutes have no application to this appeal for the following reasons: 
UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16. This statute was cited to establish that "an appeal 
from a zoning decision must be made within the time and according to the procedure 
Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix "A." 
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specified by the board of county commissioners."11 More specifically, this section provides 
a procedure for appealing alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions to the board of 
adjustment. 
The record does not disclose whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board 
of adjustment. If it has, its members are not elected officials - they are appointed by the 
county commission.12 For this reason, they do not review zoning decisions.13 Their powers 
are expressly limited to considering alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning 
resolution."14 
The City does not allege an error in zoning enprcement. It attacks the jurisdiction 
of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional use permit. 
As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been applied to avoid 
consideration of the merits of this appeal. 
The Appellate Court's interpretation also contravenes Utah case law. For instance, 
the Utah Supreme Court has approved a county commission's decision to not bestow on the 
board of adjustment the power to issue special zoning exceptions. The county commission 
elected to wield such power on its own. The Court emphasized that "the Board of 
Adjustments is constituted by statute a forum for review of all administrative zoning 
decisions, but nowhere is it made the exclusive repository of appellate powers."15 
11
 Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A." 
12
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-15. 
13
 Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); GayLand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 635 
(1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976). 
14
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added. 
Thurston, supra, p. 446. Emphasis added. 
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Serious problems will result if the instant interpretation remains. The Court's 
conclusion that zoning challenges must pursue board of adjustment appeal transfers 
legislative policy-making powers from the elected officials of the County to a board which 
is not responsible to the electorate. Such a construction poses immense governance 
problems and promotes conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities as 
articulated by their elected representatives. Under the restrictive standard of review 
imposed by the Court in this appeal, the public would have virtually no ability to overturn 
a zoning by such a non-elected body. Such a serious precedent should not have been 
established without some briefing or oral argument by the parties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a second basis 
for its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.16 This 
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to city 
board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials. This section has 
nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be 
applied to this case.17 
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. Like 
the County's board of adjustment statute,18 it addresses only to appeals from enforcement 
decisions and does not authorize the board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones 
themselves. Further, this section does not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals. 
1R 
Opinion, p. 15. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A." 
17
 See Davis County v. Clearf eld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court of Appeals 
rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to municipal 
planning matters. 
18
 See Section 1, above. 
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Section 10-9-9 is facially inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the 
basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal. Further, application of that 
section in this appeal poses the same legal and governance problems as use of the County 
board of adjustment statute. Its retention in the Court's decision will create a precedent 
of serious consequence. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also used to establish that the City 
had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's rezoning.19 This 
section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing decisions by city boards of 
adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part of the Utah Municipal Code 
and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities for the purposes of that code and 
this section has nothing to do with County zoning decisions whatsoever.20 Even if it did 
apply to counties, it does not purport to establish a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning 
decisions. 
The immediate effect of these errors is to deny the parties consideration of 
the merits of this appeal. The long-term effect is greater. If permitted to stand, this 
decision will create confusion of governance principles and likely imdermine the ability of 
citizens to implement their goals and objectives through their elected officials in many 
communities of our state. 
Opinion, p. 15. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A.M 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
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POINT II 
THE FACTUAL RECORD HAS BEEN MISSTATED 
A SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT WERE TIMELY AND 
COMPLETE 
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's 
rezoning but states that such objection was untimely and incomplete. That conclusion 
arose partly from misapplication of the statutes discussed in Point I above. However, some 
misconstruction of the factual record was also implied in the conclusion. As shown below, 
the actual appeal record does not support this criticism: 
1. There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing.21 
The County only provided the City with a copy of the rezoning application and requested 
its recommendation.22 The zoning application omitted the estimate of project value 
required by the application form. But it did admit that the rezoning would not comply 
with the County's current land use plan.23 To this admission, the City's objection added 
that the plan also violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Crescent Community 
Citizen's Report.24 
2. There was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" at the time 
the application was made25 or when rezoning was considered.26 Value would not be 
Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2. 
22
 R15-17. 
23
 R15. 
24
 R17. 
25
 R15. 
26
 Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904. 
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determined until a building permit was actually issued.27 It would have been impossible for 
the City to have estimated the cost of development at that time.28 Even though there was 
no project information available, the City could still inform the County that M[t]he developer 
should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." This is exactly what the City did.29 
3. At the hearing on the matter, the County Commission was briefed on Sandy's 
objection to the rezoning.30 The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that 
there may be a problem with the development meeting the urban development restrictions 
of section 10-2-418 U.C.A., depending on how the development plans were eventually 
presented. He then stated that "Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the 
time the plans were submitted.31 
4. Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff 
members, the County Commission approved the rezoning.32 The ordinance was published 
on August 20, 1987.33 
5. Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a rehearing 
of its zoning decision.34 That petition reiterated that "[djevelopment on the property would 
Ril l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13. 
28
 The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask for 
a different zone depending on the market.*4 The zoning was thereupon approved by the County Commission 
without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property. 
a R 1 7 . 
30 
Envelope 5, Document 6. 
31
 Id., p. 906. 
3 2
 Id., pp. 906-907. 
3 3
 R19. 
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constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not attempted to annex 
the property to Sandy City as required by 10-2-418, U.C.A. 1953." The petition also stated 
that "[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this property contradicts the Little 
Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for rural residential use on the 
property."35 
6. The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit City 
representatives to speak.36 The Commission denied the City's request and directed that if 
the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning Commission 
through the conditional use process.37 
7. The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its protest 
to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and master plan 
violations described above.38 When that was unsuccessful, the City filed a timely appeal to 
the County Commission as required by County ordinance.39 When its protests were rejected 
there, the City promptly initiated this action in conformance with the process defined by the 
County Attorney.40 
3 5
 id. 
36
 T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p, 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had "ample 
opportunity to present evidence." p. 13. 
37
 Envelope 5, Documents 8-9 . 
38
 R27-29. 
39
 R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision). 
40
 "Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not 
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the 
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not the half mile is applicable." Envelope 5, 
Document 9, p. 1114. 
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The above chronology illustrates that (1) the City raised its development objections 
prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was not available 
to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the City's objection; 
(3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may violate urban 
development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the property, deferring its 
decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the development until a specific 
development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested reconsideration of the County's 
decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was denied and the City was directed 
to pursue its objection through the conditional use process; (7) the City complied with the 
County's direction and fully participated at all stages of the conditional use process as 
defined by ordinance; and (8) through this action, the City timely appealed the rezoning 
and conditional use permits in the manner defined by the County Attorney. 
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this 
development. The court's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record of these 
events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process. 
B. THE COUNTY'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County had 
made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."41 This 
conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that development 
costs for the site would exceed $750,000: 
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County 
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to day, 
however, the value of the development is determined when the building 
permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people to purchase 
*
1
 Opinion, p. 14. 
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a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid annexation. In this 
particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire site is developed it will 
exceed the $750,000 figure. This legal issue will have to be addressed with the 
cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy City."42 
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that their 
costs for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.43 No evidence was 
introduced to refute this testimony.44 The County's findings therefore directly contradict the 
undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was misplaced. The 
court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts contained in the record 
on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURTS DECISION WILL CAUSE 
UNFAIRNESS IF NOT CORRECTED 
The City respectfully suggests that the foregoing errors of law and fact will cause 
unfairness to the parties if not corrected. The following are examples of this effect: 
1. The principle basis of the court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative 
defense by any of the parties to this action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered 
by the parties, the agencies, or lower court. Thus, the parties have been entirely deprived 
of the opportunity to address the issue upon which their rights were determined. 
Ril l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13. 
Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10. 
44
 R108. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not address 
costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's findings 
even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that a residuum 
of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is discussed on p. 18 
of Appellant's reply brief. 
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2. The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative 
appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally in 
the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its 
objections in a timely fashion at each stage. Where the parties have agreed on an appeal 
procedure which is consistent with all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes 
unfairness to refuse rudimentary discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis 
that an alternative procedure was not selected. The court would advance justice by 
providing the same presumption to the County's defined grievance procedure as it has to 
all other aspects of the County's decisions. 
3. The court's decision to permit a local government to submit massive amounts 
of evidentiary materials at summary judgment hearings, without advance notice to the 
parties and without permitting a recess to review the same, and after the opposing party has 
completed its briefing and oral argument, creates a precedent certain to undermine the 
ability of future citizens to avoid the ambush inherent in such a procedure.45 
4. To conclude that the City "had sufficient time and opportunity during the 
pendency of the action before the county commissions to develop and present evidence in 
its favor and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence"46 overlooks the fact that the 
proposed projects had not been disclosed or that development costs were otherwise 
The court seems to have assumed that the approximately six inches of documents submitted by the County 
in this action were maintained by the County prior to the action in the same condition as they were presented 
to the district court. That assumption is not supported by the record and is not accurate. The record was 
assembled by the County from numerous sources for purposes of the summary judgment hearing. Some 
selectivity is inherent in such a process as evidenced by the fact that the record was determined to be incomplete 
when presented and had to be supplemented. If the county attorney was unable to locate all the relevant records 
for the hearing it is difficult to see how a citizen of the county can be assumed to have complete advance 
knowledge of the same. 
46
 Opinion, p. 13. 
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unavailable from the developers. It was the County, not the City, which failed in its burden 
to require evidence of project costs and compliance with the master plan, so as to establish 
a competent basis for its jurisdiction to proceed.47 
5. When the City was finally able to obtain a professional cost appraisal on its 
own, demonstrating that the development would surely exceed $750,000, such estimates had 
no effect on the County's decision to proceed with its approvals.48 To permit County 
jurisdiction to be upheld solely on statements without competent evidentiary foundation 
encourages the County to continue to ignore competent evidence when presented, contrary 
to the facts and in its self interest. 
6. The court's conclusion that zoning challenger must pursue appeals to boards 
of adjustment has the effect of transfering legislative policy-making powers from the elected 
officials of the County to a board which is not responsible to the electorate. Such a 
construction undermines representative government and separation of powers principles. 
It also promotes administrative conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities 
as articulated by their elected representatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant thanks the court for the extensive time it has taken to review this 
case and the courtesy provided to the parties at oral argument. However, on the basis of 
the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that there are significant factual and 
County ordinance 19.84.090 places the evidentiary burden on the county to demonstrate conformance with 
the intent of the county master plan. R22. 
48
 Envelope 1, Document 11, p. 1389. (McDonald Appeal) 
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legal issues which compel a reconsideration of the court's decision. The Appellant also 
believes that oral argument is appropriate in the circumstances as provided for in Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
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APPENDIX "A" 
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled — 
Transmission of papers. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by 
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of 
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is 
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers con-
stituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. 
10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limita-
tion. 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the 
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings. 
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regu-
lations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a board of adjustment 
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such 
members. Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time 
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners 
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of 
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the 
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of 
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners 
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for 
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appoint-
ments. The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of 
such board, and in the event that any regular member be temporarily unable 
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the 
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary 
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose. 
The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning or 
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, and 
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsistent 
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supple-
mental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rules. 
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provide 
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropri-
ate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the 
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regula-
tions in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commissioners 
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps and 
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or similar 
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulations. 
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairman 
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. The 
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and 
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjustment 
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings 
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to 
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other 
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